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Democratic Credentials* 
Don Herzog 
We've made a mistake, urges Bruce Ackerman. We've failed to notice, 
or have forgotten, that ours is a dualist democracy: ordinary represen- 
tatives passing their statutes are in fact the democratic inferiors of We 
the People, who at rare junctures appear on the scene and affirm new 
constitutional principles. (Actually, he claims in passing that we have 
a three-track democracy.)' Dwelling lovingly on dualism, Ackerman 
doesn't quite forget to discuss democracy, but he comes close. 
I want to raise some questions about the democratic credentials 
of Ackerman's view. Not, perhaps, the ones he anticipates. So I don't 
mean to argue that the Constitution places illicit restraints on popu- 
larly elected assemblies: I find the so-called countermajoritarian diffi- 
culty at least as boring as does Ackerman. (More generally, any legal 
theory promising to relax our obsessive focus on appellate review is 
to be applauded, though ironically, this one turns out to be very much 
about that after all.) Nor do I mean to cast Publius as the fiend who 
subverts the democratic promise of the Revolution in the name of 
class interest: I find Beard and his legacy at least as mischievous as 
does Ackerman. (Though Arendt's quirky misreading of Athenian 
democracy is a dubious remedy.) 
Democracy, to say something screamingly obvious, is a complex 
ideal. I am historicist enough to believe that a fully adequate account 
of democracy must in part be a critical history not just of the concept, 
not just of some classic texts of democractic theory, but of high politics 
and social practices as well. Since I can't provide that history here, I 
will instead have to rely on an appeal to the reader's linguistic intuitions 
and baldly assert that the complexities I discuss here are indeed inter- 
nal to democratic theory. 
* My thanks to Heidi Li Feldman, Larry Kramer, Rick Pildes, and Terry Sandalow 
for comments on a draft. 
1. Bruce Ackerman, We the People, vol. 1, Foundations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, Belknap Press, 1991), p. 300. All page references in the text are to 
Ackerman's book. 
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FORM AND CONTENT, DEMOCRACY AND RIGHTS 
Against "rights foundationalists," Ackerman holds that whatever rights 
the Supreme Court is justified in enforcing (and whatever rights we 
have?) are those democratically affirmed by the last incarnation of We 
the People. (Because they have the right to decide what our rights 
are? And where did that right come from?) In their quest for "the 
Right rights," these foundationalists turn to classic philosophical texts. 
Their "discourse is invariably esoteric"; they suffer an "antidemocratic 
disease"; they reveal "the elitism involved in removing fundamental 
questions from the democratic process" (p. 12). 
Here Ackerman imagines (or caricatures) a rights theorist who 
wants to secure some right by arguing that it's so important that not 
even a democratic process ought to be allowed to override it. There 
may be good arguments for such a view, but leave that aside. Instead, 
consider a different strategy a rights theorist might adopt, one holding 
that some rights are required to make sense of the claim that whatever 
ensues is democratic.2 
Take the right of free speech and its various concomitants: diverse 
news media recognizing a Weberian obligation to dig up facts embar- 
rassing all partisan points of view, the availability of vigorous public 
debate, and so on. Notice that the right in turn depends on the develop- 
ment of a loyal opposition, now a bland label but once, given familiar 
views of social order as consensus, a threatening oxymoron. One might 
well believe that democracy is at least in part something like govern- 
ment by discussion, that public debate is central, voting (whether in 
elections or legislatures) merely a subordinate device for capturing the 
current sense of the debate. (So one might doubt the historiographic 
convention that casts liberalism and democracy as uneasy allies or 
cordial foes.) 
Now suppose that the people decide on massive incursions against 
free speech. Decades of Republican whining about the alleged biases 
of the liberal media pay off in spectacular political dividends: Peter 
Jennings is placed under house arrest; CNN is instructed to broadcast 
Rocky and Bullwinkle reruns twenty-four hours a day; major Ameri- 
can newspapers are censored, or instructed to do nothing but reprint 
2. For one version of the general argument, see Amy Gutmann, "How Liberal is 
Democracy?" in Liberalism Reconsidered, ed. Douglas MacLean and Claudia Mills (Totowa, 
N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld, 1983). John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of 
Judicial Review (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), offers such a view 
in the context of constitutional law. Ackerman indicts him as a monist but does not 
notice the implications of his strategy for thinking about democracy and rights. Then 
again, Ely thinks that by turning to "democracy" he has answered some questions; in 
fact, he has raised new ones, and judges and others might well disagree on what it 
means to reinforce democracy. 
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official government press releases without comment; and so on. Would 
this be a democratic decision? 
Suppose the decision followed vigorous public debate with lots of 
competing views championed and heard respectfully. Then one might 
describe it as a democratic decision to suspend or overturn or abridge 
democracy itself. Imagining another kind of repellent amendment, 
Ackerman comments, "I do not believe that judges would be justified 
in asserting a general authority to protect the fundamental principles 
of dualist democracy against repudiation by the People" (p. 16 n.). But 
more is at stake than the scope of judicial authority. We want to know 
if "the People" can do anything they like and nonetheless remain 
"the People," or if some of their actions threaten or undercut their 
own status. 
Now consider the decisions taken after the assault on free speech 
is institutionalized as higher law. Elections don't feature even the im- 
poverished public debate they now do. Proceedings within the legisla- 
tive chambers change, too: communicative links between representa- 
tives and constituents are far sketchier than before; or perhaps the 
majority party takes advantage of parliamentary rules by allowing 
minority members to take the floor only on alternate Tuesday morn- 
ings. Are elections and legislative acts democratic any more? 
More important here: consider the next broad-based popular 
movement, say a drive to adopt various green principles and systemati- 
cally downgrade whatever private law might seem to protect smoke- 
stacks, dumping, and the rest. Respecting the terms of the last constitu- 
tional settlement, this new movement takes place with little or no 
public debate. Does it qualify as higher lawmaking, as the waking of 
We the People? Ackerman lists three criteria for identifying such a 
movement: depth, breadth, and decisiveness. Here I want to focus on 
depth: "A private citizen's support is deep when she has deliberated as 
much about her commitment to a national ideal as she thinks appropri- 
ate in making a considered judgment on an important decision in her 
private life" (pp. 273-74). 
If we take this at face value, it is not clear that any incursion on 
free speech, however severe, could threaten the credentials of the 
people here. For Ackerman is describing a kind of citizenship that is 
private with a vengeance, one in which every citizen can do all her 
deliberating sitting by herself, daydreaming over a cup of coffee in 
the morning, just as she might in thinking about whether to take a 
new job or have another child. It is more charitable, though, to think 
that Ackerman's prose is sloppy. For he clearly thinks that when the 
sleepy or absent people rise to life, they deliberate together, as a 
community. 
I have chosen free speech only for illustrative purposes; there 
may be other tacit criteria governing the use of 'the people'. Take one 
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of Ackerman's own claims: "Apart from the special need for tolerance, 
the citizenship perspective will often require you to reflect on the vast 
size of your country, the need to give interests of Americans on the 
other side of the continent equal weight to your neighbor's. As citizens, 
all of us are equals; no region, race, or sect can be ruthlessly sacrificed 
to the rest" (pp. 298-99). What kind of claim is this? 
It might be taken as a request or advice or exhortation: Ackerman 
means only to recommend one mode of deliberation that he takes to 
be attractive, but we are free to spurn the recommendation. Or it 
might be taken as a substantive moral or political requirement: we 
must deliberate this way, else we do significant wrong. Or, again, it 
might be taken as stating criteria governing the use of 'citizenship': 
so people who fail to deliberate this way can't be described as citizens 
at all, not even as bad citizens, and can't politically act as the people. 
To sharpen what's at stake in these competing glosses, imagine a 
popular movement that, after plenty of deliberation, moves to conse- 
crate certain facets of contemporary racism with all the lofty imprima- 
tur of constitutional law. The Reconstruction amendments are to be 
overturned; blacks are to be officially recognized as second-class citi- 
zens or stripped of citizenship altogether; claims of gross economic 
inequality, of differential treatment in criminal proceedings, and so 
on are to have no weight in law or are to be taken as inherently 
choiceworthy, as legitimate goals of state action. 
What might Ackerman say about this? Not, I trust, that it can't 
happen here. (I write in the immediate aftermath of the Rodney King 
fiasco, but we didn't need that to notice that ours is a profoundly racist 
society.) As Ackerman sometimes grants in passing but more often 
blithely ignores, the people aren't some harmoniously unified commu- 
nity. They-we-are profoundly divided: the currently fashionable 
troika is race, class, gender, but of course there are many more cleav- 
ages. So such an explicitly racist movement could emerge. And it 
could easily meet his three official conditions of depth (degree of 
deliberation), breadth (quantity of support), and decisiveness (de- 
feating every plausible alternative in turn). But it wouldn't fit the 
language I've just quoted, for it would ruthlessly flaunt even minimal 
requirements of equality and impartiality. 
If that language is just exhortation, then Ackerman might shrug: 
"Look, I refuse to play fancy Europhile philosopher and identify what 
rights people have over and against our higher democratic politics; I 
happen to loathe this decision, but the People have now spoken." If 
the language is a moral or political requirement, Ackerman might 
instead concede that the people have spoken, but urge that they 
haven't done so in any way we need to recognize as binding. So again 
would arise problems about what courts and other bodies ought to do 
in the face of such outrageous developments. If the language states 
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criteria governing our use of 'the people', Ackerman might deny that 
such problems arise in the first place. But then he would be insisting 
that some rights are integral to democratic politics in the very strong 
sense that one can't even recognize a decision as democratic if it violates 
those rights. 
Another approach to this idea: Ackerman asserts that in his view, 
private citizenship, not dualism, "is foundational" (p. 300). But the 
very possibility of private citizenship depends on a robust state/society 
distinction, on the existence of extrapolitical social spaces. And that 
means that rights less obviously connected to democracy will be consti- 
tutively required to make sense of Ackerman's vision. Rights such 
as religious toleration, private property, and domestic privacy help 
demarcate some realms of society as being in some sense off-limits to 
politics. If private citizenship is "foundational" in any straightforward 
sense, the whole scheme presupposes some such set of rights. 
I chose free speech purely for illustrative purposes; so too (the 
devil can quote Scripture) the language of equality and impartiality 
and that of private citizenship. More generally, one might put the 
point this way: whether it is sensible to talk about the people acting 
in constitutionally binding ways depends on background criteria of 
various kinds. Some of these criteria look like substantive moral re- 
quirements, even rights. But then the project of distinguishing the 
merely formal requirements of democratic action from the substance 
of rights will collapse; calling the Constitution "democratic first, rights- 
protecting second" (p. 13) will be confounding, not illuminating. And 
the business of deriding rights theorists as diseased bookworms will 
turn out to be utterly bankrupt. 
One last way to drive to the same point: the distinction between 
normal and constitutional politics turns out to be (at least) three distinc- 
tions mapped onto each other. Normal politics is pursued by elected 
representatives, constitutional by the people themselves; normal poli- 
tics is not particularly reflective, constitutional is; normal politics is 
about the pluralist pursuit of group interest, constitutional about prin- 
ciple and the common good. But these distinctions may diverge; in- 
deed, any connections among them seem utterly contingent. Acker- 
man's explicit criteria capture the first two, but not the last. So what 
shall we say about putative constitutional movements that do not adopt 
misguided or pernicious principles, but don't seem principled at all? 
(The people deliberate and decide to affirm publicly that politics ought 
to benefit the middle class at the expense of rich and poor, and they 
refuse to offer any principled justification for doing so.) 
What is at stake in asking whether any or all of these decisions is 
democratic? Not just the meaning of a word, surely; rather, their 
legitimacy, or the reasons we have for upholding a certain framework 
of political decision making, for thinking that ordinarily at least the 
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laws it issues in oblige citizens and that the framework is worth uphold- 
ing. There is no magic surrounding the people, even if we solemnly 
capitalize them as We the People, such that their actions automatically 
command respect. Or, put differently, absent certain background con- 
ditions, we may want to say that broad-based popular movements don't 
count as the actions of the people, or We the People. 
I suppose one could always take the short way with dissenters, 
here as elsewhere, and say that the three official criteria are exhaustive. 
Depth doesn't even presuppose free speech, one might argue, because 
it is deliberately cast in terms of a solitary citizen pondering the alterna- 
tives. Nothing surrounding the evocative if vague contrast of "private 
citizenship" with "private citizenship" should be taken to suggest any- 
thing like impartiality, equality, or the common good being taken as 
a necessary condition of the actions of citizens. And so on. 
But this won't do. As a methodological matter, I suspect that in 
this sort of terrain one never finds anything as crisply architectonic as 
necessary and sufficient criteria, anyway. One roughly identifies the 
outlines of a concept and then agrees on some version of an indefeasi- 
bility thesis, that in often surprising and indefinitely many ways the 
scope of the concept will depend on factors we haven't yet noticed. 
As a substantive matter, paring down the criteria to the three stated 
ones threatens to turn the higher lawmaking moments of dualist de- 
mocracy into nothing but crass majoritarianism. And that, surely, 
doesn't inspire gushy epiphanies. It plays into the hands of centuries 
of distinguished antidemocratic theory caustically mocking the thought 
that the mob or multitude or many-headed monster have any claim 
to rule. That 51 percent (or 73 percent or 99 percent) of the people 
want to do something is not yet enough to engage the attention of 
democratic theorists, let alone anyone else. Casting democracy as a 
matter of counting heads or aggregating preferences is an impover- 
ished approach; the prevalence of such views is lamentable. 
Perhaps I should emphasize that the strategy of casting rights as 
presuppositions of democracy isn't a sneaky way of denying the people 
any significant discretion, so that one and only one program-call it 
the politically correct one-is really democratic after all. There's still 
plenty of room for tenacious political disagreements; indeed, for a 
democratic society to adopt bad policies. I happen to think of our 
fabled budget deficits as terribly imprudent and unjust, but I have no 
problem describing them as democratic. 
JUDICIAL REVIEW, CONSENT, PARTNERSHIP, IDENTITY 
One sometimes hears that Marshall single-handedly invented judicial 
review in Marbury v. Madison. But this seems contrived: Hamilton, 
anyway, casts judicial review as an integral part of the constitutional 
scheme. And his presentation in Federalist 78 lends itself to a dualist 
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reading: "A constitution is in fact, and must be, regarded by thejudges 
as a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its 
meaning as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from 
the legislative body. If there should happen to be an irreconcileable 
variance between the two, that which has the superior obligation and 
validity ought of course to be preferred; or in other words, the consti- 
tution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people 
to the intention of their agents."3 Here's the solution to the counterma- 
joritarian difficulty: downgrade the democratic credentials of legisla- 
tion, upgrade those of constitutional law, and the Supreme Court can 
protect the people against those only problematically representing 
them. 
Addressed to (some of) Publius's contemporaries, and given a 
certain understanding of what those popular ratifying conventions 
were about,4 it makes sense. Those particular contemporaries, after 
all, had taken part in debates over ratifying the convention. Some of 
them, say a majority of them, had voted for ratification. Now the 
skeptical objections arise: not women, not blacks, and so on; and some 
of those formally eligible, after all, opposed ratification. 
Here I want to press a different objection. The argument looks 
like it comes with a ticking stopwatch: its cogency seems to recede over 
time. As the years go by, fewer and fewer even of those who voted 
for ratification survive. (And some of them may have changed their 
minds.) Grant for the moment that the New Deal was a successful 
constitutional moment-and the last one. Then it is one thing to 
defend the democratic legitimacy of judicial review in 1937, another 
in 1947, and so on. And in 1992? How many living citizens took part 
in the New Deal? Can we tell today's citizens that we respect their 
democratic action by overturning the acts of their elected representa- 
tives in the name of what "they" did decades ago? ("What I did before 
I was born, eh?") 
The objection depends on a certain conception of how to identify 
the people, or We the People: line up the living and count. Some of 
Ackerman's own language suggests such a view, in particular when 
he plays the game of suggesting percentage thresholds for identifying 
potential action by the people (pp. 274-75). But this conception could 
easily be contested. In part, the history of social and political theory 
is a series of debates over how' to identify the people. 
3. The Federalist, ed. Jacob E. Cooke (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University 
Press, 1961), no. 78, p. 525. Though referring to elected representatives as "agents" 
suggests a much less tenuous tie than Ackerman has in mind. 
4. An understanding that of course could be-and was-challenged. See particu- 
larly "The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsyl- 
vania To Their Constituents," in The Complete Antifederalist, ed. Herbert J. Storing, 7 
vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), vol. 3, pp. 145-67. 
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Two obvious solutions depend on views that Ackerman seems 
inclined to renounce. One: even if those alive didn't themselves act 
during the New Deal, they could overturn it if they liked; so they 
consent to it; so it counts as their action. (This is how Hobbes reconciles 
the claim that law is the command of the sovereign with the existence 
of laws predating the sovereign.)5 Yet Ackerman writes, "I myself have 
never been enamored by the principle of consent, at least when it is 
used to serve as the bedrock of political life" (p. 357, n. 9). I have no 
such sweepingly general commitments for or against consent, but I'm 
happy to grant that this invocation of consent seems contrived. It 
underestimates the difficulties in overturning the last constitutional 
settlement. (Compare: "We needn't worry about even the most reck- 
lessly activist courts, because the people or their representatives can 
always overturn judgments they dislike.") 
Two: historical communities have far longer life spans than indi- 
viduals; American society is several hundred years old; so those Ameri- 
cans who happen to be alive today are implicated in the actions of 
those coming before and after them. (This is one thrust of Burke's 
savage subversion of social contract theory: "Society is indeed a con- 
tract," but a partnership "between those who are living, those who are 
dead, and those who are to be born.")6 To be an American, then, is 
in part to be a member of the community that adopted the principles 
of the New Deal, whether or not one happened to be alive then. Notice 
that the argument deals in precisely the same way with problems posed 
by unborn Americans, living Americans who opposed the New Deal, 
and living Americans not enfranchised to have a view on it: by offering 
an account of their identity that makes them responsible. (And notice 
that the argument needs to distinguish American citizens, whose iden- 
tity is to implicate them in this way, from, say, plumbers or violinists 
or tiddlywinks players, whom we may well think aren't bound at all 
by the actions of their predecessors.) 
In disdaining "Burkeans," Ackerman does grant that "the chal- 
lenge ... is to locate ourselves in a conversation between generations." 
After all, we "enter upon a political stage already set with a complex 
symbolic practice charged with meaning by the thought and action of 
prior generations" (p. 23). Yet he falls short of affirming that in some 
important sense their actions are already our actions. Indeed, Acker- 
man's insistently American stance would make it hard for him to make 
any such affirmation. For he inherits from Jefferson and Paine the 
memorable slogan that the earth belongs to the living. That slogan, 
5. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer- 
sity Press, 1991), p. 184. 
6. Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, in The Works of the Right 
Honorable Edmund Burke, 12 vols. (Boston, Little, Brown, 1889), vol. 3, p. 359. 
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once turned against feudal property regimes to suggest that one can't 
rightly be born a serf just because one's great-great-grandfather con- 
sented to serfdom, comes to stand for a kind of democratic exuberance 
in debunking the claims of history and tradition. Democrats have rou- 
tinely derided appeals to the wisdom embedded in our inherited prac- 
tices as contemptible lapses into necrophilia and ancestor worship. So 
Ackerman wants us to be able to learn from the past, but he wants us 
to remember that we can pursue radical change whenever we see fit. 
His argument thus requires some constructive account of the 
identity of the American people. He has to explain how we can coher- 
ently be taken to act as a corporate entity in ways that stretch over many 
generations, so that "we" can in 1992 finish an Article 5 ratification 
procedure that was begun some two hundred years ago. He has to 
explain the possibility of a binding unity in the face of deep cleavages 
over race, class, gender, and more. (It is emphatically not enough to 
notice occasionally that blacks, women, and others have been badly 
treated despite the inspiring possibilities of American constitutionalism 
and then simply urge them to join in to make it even better. Or, to 
put it differently, sighs about the "incredible diversity of lived experi- 
ence [as] one of the great glories of America" [p. 306] can be met with 
acerbic reminders about some of the facets of that diversity: crack, 
homelessness, street crime, child abuse, and on and on.) He has to tell 
us what to make of permanent minorities, of those so lackadaisical 
about politics that even high constitutional issues don't engage their 
attention, especially if they are lackadaisical not because they are raptly 
absorbed in the pleasures of private life but because they are utterly 
dispirited, impotent, crushed by their prior unjust treatment in the 
political realm. He has to tell us if blacks, women, children, felons, 
the "mentally ill," and others disenfranchised in American history are 
nonetheless part of the people, and if not, why they might still owe 
allegiance to the constitutional order. Invoking the phrase "We the 
People" masks substantive difficulties. At best, it counts as a promissory 
note for an argument forthcoming. Until that argument is on the 
table, the theory remains seriously incomplete. 
Can these questions be laid at the doorstep of democratic politics? 
It's paradoxical to assert that the people are just whoever the people 
say they are. We can relax the paradox, though not eliminate it, by 
adding a temporal dimension. It may be illuminating, not incoherent, 
to say that the people decided to admit women into their ranks. Still, 
we need at least some threshold or benchmark conception for identi- 
fying the people-not just for knowing who counts at the beginning 
of the historical narrative, but also to provide some critical distance 
from the decisions that happen to be taken along the way. So the 
putatively illuminating claim assumes that an exclusively male group 
can qualify as the people, and some may well want to deny that. 
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HISTORY, PUBLICITY, MYSTIFICATION 
The thought that the earth belongs to the living also fueled one of 
Jefferson's characteristically exotic arguments, complete with careful 
demographic calculations: that the Constitution ought to be rewritten 
every nineteen years. Madison scorned the view.7 Ackerman follows 
Madison in rejecting the view that there ought to be regularly sched- 
uled rewritings of the Constitution (pp. 176-77). But he overlooks 
one of Madison's reasons: "Frequent appeals would in great measure 
deprive the government of that veneration, which time bestows on 
every thing, and without which perhaps the wisest and freest govern- 
ments would not possess the requisite stability.... A nation of philoso- 
phers is as little to be expected as the philosophical race of kings 
wished for by Plato. And in every other nation, the most rational 
government will not find it a superfluous advantage, to have the preju- 
dices of the community on its side."8 Ackerman assures us that "Publius 
refuses to learn the same lesson which Burke was to draw from the 
crowds of the French Revolution" (p. 177). But this is a tad too quick. 
The language of time, veneration, and prejudice is Burkean through 
and through.9 True, Madison doesn't identify it as his most important 
reason; but there it is, stuck in the middle of the Federalist. Publius's 
mantle aside, there are some pressing questions here about democracy, 
publicity, and illusion. 
If democracy is something like government by discussion, we find 
ourselves politically engaged in demystifying, enlightening, exposing 
the allegedly arcane mysteries of statecraft to the view of the vulgar. 
So early Jacobins and democrats championed the public sphere, mass 
literacy, vivid newspaper coverage of politics, heated arguments in 
local taverns and coffeehouses; so Burke grumbled that "this new 
conquering empire of light and reason" would dissolve "all the pleasing 
illusions which made power gentle and obedience liberal."10 
Publicity here isn't part of some technical Kantian apparatus for 
thinking about social justice; it's profoundly political. It's a complex ideal: 
epistemologically, it calls for arguments available to all; sociologically for 
spaces like coffeehouses in which ordinary men and women can meet 
7. For an incisive treatment of the exchange and the surrounding issues, see Step- 
hen Holmes, "Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy," in Constitutionalism 
and Democracy, ed. Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988). 
8. Federalist, no. 49, p. 340. 
9. Similarly, Holmes writes, "According to Jefferson, 'some men look at constitu- 
tions with sanctimonious reverence, and deem them like the arc of the covenant, too 
sacred to be touched.' Madison was not one of these men" (p. 218). No, but Madison 
did wish others to incline that way. 
10. Burke, vol. 3, pp. 332-33. 
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to debate public affairs; politically, for an egalitarian recognition of those 
ordinary men and women as dignified agents entitled to participate in 
shaping their society. So the famed transformation of subjects into citi- 
zens depends crucially on publicity. This is why Paine so ruthlessly de- 
bunks the lofty theatrical trappings of monarchy, why he insists that the 
business of government can and should be made simple. It is why James 
Mackintosh sneers, "To pronounce that men are only to be governed 
by delusion is to libel the human understanding, and to consecrate the 
frauds that have elevated Despots and Muftis, Pontiffs and Sultans, on 
the ruin of degraded and oppressed humanity."11 
Sometimes Ackerman sounds like a radical prophet of publicity 
himself- or, not quite the same thing, a publicist. Take the remarkable 
language of imploring advertisement he sometimes succumbs to in 
urging the reader to purchase and read the Federalist Papers or Gordon 
Wood's Creation of the American Republic: "Perhaps you will pick up a 
paperback copy [of the Federalist] when you are next in a bookstore? 
Isn't it about time for you to encounter the Founding at first hand?" 
Or again, "The last chapter encouraged you to explore these dualist 
themes by picking up the Federalist Papers at your local bookstore and 
giving them a close (re-)reading. While it may be harder to get your 
hands on Wood's magisterial work, try to do so" (pp. 201, 218). One 
presumes this advice isn't addressed to university professors. 
Then again, Ackerman can also write, "the labor movement and 
the peace movement, blacks and ethnics, feminists and environmental- 
ists look upon each other with anxiety and suspicion. The very thought 
they might find common ground-much less common ground with 
more mainstream Americans-seems to many a vain illusion. But is 
it an illusion we can afford to live without?" (p. 318). The Jacobin 
impulse is that if it is an illusion, we can and must live without it: it 
is just another piece of mystification that stands in the way of a sober 
appraisal of our grim circumstances. Is Ackerman the writer who 
genuinely believes progress is possible? Then why does he call this 
thought an illusion? Or is he the one who wants us to believe it because 
the belief is reassuring, because it will help uphold an unjust regime 
by clothing it in illusion? 
More generally, consider Ackerman's uses of history. I wonder if 
poor Clio can shoulder the burdens he assigns her. Sometimes he 
appeals to a Dragnet theory of history, on which 'just the facts, ma'am, 
nothing but the facts" will suffice to buttress his case: "This narrative 
cannot withstand an encounter with the facts of American History"; 
11. James Mackintosh, Vindiciae Gallicae: Defence of the French Revolution and its 
English Admirers against the Accusations of the Right Hon. Edmund Burke; Including Some 
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Books, 1989, intro. Jonathan Wordsworth), p. 307. 
   
 (p. 39, 44). 
But of course the facts are complex, ambiguous, open to competing 
interpretations. I have not mastered the historiography of American 
public law, but somehow I doubt that the conventional wisdom is so 
utterly misconceived that merely invoking "the facts" can shatter it. 
Notice that we might agree to follow Ackerman's historical turn 
but disagree with his account, and at different levels of abstraction. 
Maybe he has misread Carolene Products or misunderstands the Recon- 
struction amendments. Or we might deny, for instance, that he has 
rightly identified the three constitutional episodes of American history. 
Some might well argue that the tumultuous events of the 1960s consti- 
tute an independently successful constitutional revolution, not just an 
affirming footnote to the New Deal that helps make sense of Brown 
v. Board of Education; others might plump for the Reagan years. Still 
others will want to undercut the rigidity of the two-track (or three- 
track) scheme and urge instead a dimensional or continuous view 
along which particular acts may be more or less representative of 
the people themselves. Still others will read Publius as holding that 
representative government is a better instantiation of democracy than 
any direct popular movement because elections and representation 
promise to refine public opinion and allow the common good to pre- 
vail: this would explain the battery of constitutional provisions that 
deliberately make representative government less immediately respon- 
sive to popular will, like the electoral college and indirect election of 
the Senate. (To recur to the three distinctions between normal and 
constitutional politics, Publius may be betting on the combination 
representative, reflective, and about the common good.) So the turn 
to history isn't the name of a solution to some familiar problems; it's 
the name of a new set of problems. 
Ackerman sometimes sounds cavalier or innocent in another way. 
Sometimes he cheerfully suggests that other scholars' readings of the 
Federalist Papers are partial, interested, opportunistic, while his own is 
simply faithful to Publius: "Here disagreements abound, as each writer 
appropriates the Papers for his or her own programmatic purposes; 
despite the cacophony of voices, all fail to hear the voice of the revolu- 
tionary Publius" (p. 223)-as though Ackerman has been lucky or 
careful or divinely favored enough to receive the textual or historical 
message without static or distortion. But this version of a contrast 
between interested and accurate interpretation is incoherent. Surely 
his own account is like the others, programmatic through and through. 
Surely it does what all interpretations always do: it seizes on some 
dimensions of the text, downplays others, recontextualizes certain pas- 
sages to shift their meaning, and so on. After all, why does Ackerman 
want to clothe himself in Publian garb? Because it legitimates his own 
enterprise: because many of us venerate Publius. 
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In this light, consider some striking features of Ackerman's rheto- 
ric: the earnestly preachy tone, the ludicrous use of capital letters 
on key words and phrases like We the People, the unabashed and 
occasionally cloying enthusiasm for American constitutionalism. The- 
orists interested in reconstructing the argument may be inclined to 
dismiss these features as distracting tics, but rhetoric matters. And 
what is the import of this rhetoric? It animates a version of patriotism 
I am inclined to take as debased or vulgar: nothing as relentlessly silly 
as "America, love it or leave it," but not so critically searching an 
appraisal into the way our history has failed our best aspirations as 
one might like, either. That kind of patriotic rhetoric meshes all too 
well with his flirtation with useful illusions, his stylized invocation of 
history as unequivocally and authoritatively on his side, his gathering 
himself in Publius's robes, to shut down debate on fundamental issues: 
I doubt this is Ackerman's intention, but I do think it one unmistakable 
thrust of his work. Here I'd recommend learning from the antidemo- 
crats who have jeered at democratic chatter, legislative talk shops, and 
the like. For the issues Ackerman glances over are central to the pursuit 
of democratic theory and politics. Perhaps the coming volumes of his 
work will address them. 
